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ABSTRACT 
A single economic agent controls a variety of activities. Each activity is associated with a 
privately observed piece of information. The information is relevant to the actions he will take in 
this activity, and to the vulnerability of this activity to attack by another agent. Actions should be 
chosen so as partially to hide the private information, as well as to be efficient in the productive 
sense. This paper gives a characterization of the optimal association of actions to activities based on 
the private information available. Some applications are discussed. 
COMPETITION ON MANY FRONTS: 
A STACKELBERG SIGNALLING EQUILIBRIUM 
Jerry Green* and Jean-Jacques Laffont** 
1. Introduction
This paper presents a model of competition, or potential competition, between two agents 
that takes place simultaneously on many fronts. One economic agent, the incumbent, is operating on 
all these fronts. He faces the possibility that on each front he will be "attacked" by the other agent. 
We will give a variety of examples of such situations below, in the context of further specifications 
of the model. Suffice it to say, for the present, that the "fronts" may be a multiplicity of products 
being produced by a firm, the locations of economic, or even military, activity, the specific services 
provided to a variety of clients, or many other similar situations. The "attack" can be, for example, a 
military attack, or it can represent entry into direct economic competition against the incumbent in a 
market, or it can represent a legal action taken against the clients of the incumbent based on 
observations of their actions. 
The fronts are distinguished from each other by a characteristic, or set of characteristics, 
known to the incumbent but unknown to the potential competitor. This characteristic, to be denoted 
0, plays three roles in the model. 
First, there is an action, x, to be taken by the incumbent on each front. The payoff to the 
incumbent, if he is not attacked on that front, is given by u (x, 0). Thus, there would be a desire to 
tailor the action x to the characteristic 0, but for the fact that would allow the attacker to make . 
accurate inferences about 0 by virtue of his observations of x. 
Second, 0 affects the value of making an attack to the potential competitor. If he attacks on 
a front whose characteristic is 0, he gains v (0). This may represent the expected value of an attack 
whose actual result it uncertain, but where the probability of the success depends on 0. 
Alternatively, the result of the attack may be independent of 0, but the value of having attacked, for 
example the post-entry duopoly profit, may depend on 0. One should interpret v (0) as the value of 
attack, net of any direct costs of doing so. 
Third, 0 may affect the cost that the attack, if made, would impose on the incumbent. This 
is represented by w (0). It comprises the direct costs of a defense, if one is attempted, and the
expected costs of the result of the attack, for example the loss of market share and the change in 
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market conditions resulting from a duopolistic post-entry situation. 
We assume that there are many fronts and that, therefore, the empirical distribution of 0 
across the fronts is the same as the a priori belief, F (0), held by the potential attacker with respect to 
each given front. We also assume that the incumbent chooses x at each front in advance of the 
attacker's choice. Moreover we assume that the incumbent knows that the attacker will be inferring 
the value of 0 from his observation of x using Bayes' rule, based on the prior F and a knowledge of 
how incumbent's choice of x depends on 0.1
The problem we solve in this paper is the optimization problem of the incumbent described 
above, under some special, but perhaps relevant, assumptions about u, v and w. The result we
obtain is quite a strong one. For despite the complexity of this problem, and its non-standard nature 
as an optimization problem, we can show that the incumbent will select x (0) non-stochastically for 
each 0, and that the function x (0) can be described quite simply. In addition we can characterize the
set of 0's at which an attack will take place, and the complementary set on which an attack is 
avoided. 
For purposes of comparison we also analyze the Bayesian Perfect equilibria of the same 
model,2 in which each front is controlled by an agent who optimizes given a knowledge of his own
0. This is the appropriate model when commitment to act according to a given behavioral rule, the
choice of x function of 0, is impossible to enforce and each "front" optimizes independently. 
Our results demonstrate a striking qualitative difference between the Stackelberg and 
Bayesian Perfect equilibria. The latter, as is well-known, involve a combination of separating and 
pooling. The characteristics that are pooled fonn an interval in the middle of the characteristics 
space. Optimal strategies in the Stackelberg case also involve pooling-but of quite a different 
nature. For an interval in the characteristics space there are pairs of values, one vulnerable to attack 
and the other not, for which the principal will choose the same action. Only these two characteristics 
are pooled together at this action. Thus the optimal strategy uses a whole range of actions to pool 
the continuum of pairs of characteristics in the pooled interval. 
The problem is set up in Section 2. Section 3 offers a discussion in the context of an . 
industrial organization application. Section 4 states the main results and provides further 
commentary on the relationship between the solution of the incumbent's problem and the Bayesian 
Perfect equilibrium. Proofs, which are long, are deferred to appendices. Section 5 gives a brief 
numerical example. 
1. Attackers can represent either a single entrant who can enter on all 0 or a continnum of potential local entrants. We
assume that attackers get to know the incumbent's strategy by sampling. In the second case above, sampling must be done 
jointly. 
2. Bayesian Perfect equilibrium of a closely related model was studied by Milgrom and Roberts (1982).
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2. The Problem
We assume that the domain of the parameter 0 is a bounded interval 0 = [0min•0maxl of real
numbers. The distribution function of 0 is assumed to be atomless and is denoted F .  Its density is 
denoted f; it is, for simplicity, assumed to be continuously differentiable on 9 and strictly positive. 
The set of possible actions is assumed to be the real line. 
A strategy for the incumbent is a stochastic kernel s ( · I 0), which is a measure over the real
line for each 0 e E>. This allows for randomized choices of x, although as we will show, they are
not used at the optimum. 
The reaction of the potential attackers depends on their belief about 0 given the observations 
x. Let H ( · Ix) be the conditional distribution over 0 that would be obtained by Bayes' rule. If an
attack is made, the expected payoff to the attacker depends only upon whether or not 0 exceeds a 
- -
Critical value 0 E 0. If 0 > 0, the attacker gains an amount V + > 0, if 0 ::;; 0, the attacker loses an
amount -v _ (v _ < 0). One interpretation of this is that the attack succeeds or fails according to this
condition. Once an attack has succeeded, however, the payoff to the attacker is independent of 0, 
and of the associated decision x. Thus the expected payoff to an attack will be 
v+H (9+1x) +vJl (9_1x) (2.1) 
where 9+ = {0 I 0 > S}, 0_ = {0 I 0 ::;; S}. An alternative notation that will sometimes be used is to
define the function 
v (0) = v + if 0 > 0
= v_ if 0 ::;; 0
and then the expected value of an attack is just f v (0)dH (0 Ix), often denoted f vdH.
The alternative to attacking is not to attack, and the value of not attacking is normalized to 
be zero. As is typical in the incentives literature, we will assume that the agent attacks only if (2.1) 
is strictly positive. The incumbent presumes that the attacker will form his beliefs according to the 
Bayesian method described above. Thus the incumbent assumes that in choosing his strategy he is 
able to manipulate the attacker's beliefs. Instances in which this is a plausible model of the 
incumbent's behavior will be described in the next section. 
We assume that for each 0 the incumbent's utility is derived from two sources. First, the 
action x is payoff relevant to him and he experiences a utility u (0,x) if x is the decision associated
with 0. We assume that u is twice differentiable, strictly concave in x and that Uxa > 0. Moreover,
for each 0 there is a value of x, denoted x * (0), that maximizes u (0,x ) . It follows that x * (0) is a
continuously increasing function. 
Second, there is a disutility to being attacked. The level of the disutility depends on whether 
or not 0 > S. If 0 > 0 is attacked it is w + and if 0 ::;; S is attacked it is w _. Following the 
interpretation mentioned above, one could say that defending against an unsuccessful attack costs 
w _, but the loss incurred in a successful attack is w +· Although it might be natural to assume
w + > w _, we will not need that hypothesis below.
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Let w (0) = w + if 0 > 0
=w_ if 0:::;; 0.
Consider a strategy s ( · I 0). Let As � R be the set of x e R such that (2.1) is strictly
positive. We will call As the set of attacked values, given the strategy s. 
The incumbent's utility can then be written as 
J{ Ju (x ,0)ds (x I 0) - J w (0)ds (x I 0)l dF (0)
e R xeA, J 
(2.2) 
We study the problem of maximizing (2.2) by the choice of the strategy s .  The complexity 
(and non-linearity) of this problem is due to the particular nature of the dependence of As on s. 
A Stackelberg signalling equilibrium is a strategy s * (  · I · ) which maximizes (2.2).
3. An Application
. There are several key ingredients in the model which determine its domain of applicability. 
The attacker must believe passively, not developing a reputation for attacking in any way other than 
independent optimization at each front. The attacker must also be able to learn the leader's strategy. 
These assumptions are most likely to be satisfied in a setting where the principal must choose his 
action once and for all and temporally before the attacker is present. 
An example of this might be a retailer or a bank who is operating at many locations, initially 
in the absence of any competition. The incumbent may be the first firm to have expanded into a new 
area. It is reasonable to suppose that it will soon learn the profitability of each of its locations. At 
more profitable locations it might be optimal to expand the hours of business, increase staff or 
enlarge its physical facility. 
But the bank knows that if it were to do so it would be giving future competitors the 
knowledge of the quality of each location. The competitor could learn the relationship between the 
observable attributes of the incumbent' s locations and their underlying quality by entering at a 
sample of locations and drawing the appropriate inferences. Then it could target its entries at all the 
other locations accordingly. As the total number of locations is very large, the mistakes made in the 
initial sample are insignificant in the total payoff. 
Because the incumbent's characteristics are fixed once and for all, there is no scope for the 
entrant to try to manipulate the incumbent by engaging in any non-myopic behavior. Moreover, 
even after the initial entry (attack) at various cites, it turns out that the incumbent's optimal strategy 
is unchanged. Therefore, when the next entrant (if any) is present, he will not find it profitable to 
attack anywhere. All values of the observable for which there is a positive expected benefit of 
attacking have already been attacked by the previous entrant. 
To be sure, some of the specific assumptions of section 2-such as the invariance of the 
costs of an attack to the incumbent to the characteristics of the front in question--may not be 
satisfied in a particular application. Nevertheless, we believe that the strategic situation studied here, 
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where the incumbent can make a commitment to his strategy and the attacker cannot, does 
characterize many competitive situations where "many fronts" are involved. 
4. Statement of Results
In Theorem 1, we describe the qualitative features of any optimal strategy if an optimal
strategy exists. Theorem 2 proves the existence of an optimal strategy under our assumptions. To 
contrast the Stackelberg signalling equilibrium with the Bayesian perfect equilibria (Proposition 1) 
we first characterize the Bayesian perfect equilibria using a mild condition on out of equilibrium 
expectations (Theorem 3). 
Theorem 1: If s*( · I · ) is an optimal strategy, it is almost everywhere equal to a strategy s ( · I ·) - -
such that there exists an interval T =[a ,b] c 0, possibly degenerate and containing 0, and- -
increasing functions y ( · ) : T ri 0_ � IR and z ( · ): T ri 0+ � IR such that:
1) for 0 � T, s ( · I 0) is concentrated at x = x *(0)
2) for 0 E T (J 0_, s ( . I 0) is concentrated at x = y (0)
3). for 0 e T ri 0+, s ( · I 0) is concentrated at x = z (0)
4) v _f (0)i (0) + v +f (0 )y (0) = o a.e with y (0) = z (0) for any 0 e f ri 0_.- -
5) y (a) = z (0); y (0) = z (b)
Proof: see appendix. 
Let us call S the subset of strategies that can be described by a 3-tuple T = [a ,b] c 0, 
y ( · ),z ( · ) with y ( · ) and z ( · ) increasing and satisfying 4) 5) of Theorem 1.
With Theorem 1 we can reduce the existence problem to the existence of a solution to (2.2) 
in S . Then , the optimization problem (2.2) can be rewritten: 
a a 
max J u (x *(0),0)f (0)d 0 + Ju (y (0),0) f (0)d 0(a ,b ,y ( '),z ( . )) e a 
e S mm 
b em .. 
+ Ju (z (0),0)f (0)d 0 + J u (x *(0),0)f (0)d 0
a b 
(4.1) 
We show below that there exists a solution to program ( 4.1) and therefore, from Theorem 1, 
that there exists a solution to program (2.2). 
Theorem 2: There exists a solution to program ( 4.1) (which is not necessarily unique). 
Proof: Let 'lf(0) = z-1(y (0)) (well defined because z is increasing).
4) 5) in Theorem 1 imply:
· v_ f (0) '1'(9) = -v: . f ('lf(0))
0 = 'lf(a) 
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(4.2) 
( 4.3) 
This is a differential equation in 'If( · ) with a boundary condition. Since f ( · ) is
differentiable and bounded below by a strictly positive number, there exists from the fundamental 
existence theorem of the theory of differential equations (Pontryagin (1962)) a differentiable
solutions 'l'a*(0) defined on [0in/ ,0max]. 
From (4.2), 'Va* is increasing in 0 with a derivative bounded below by a strictly positive
number. 
Moreover, the differentiability of 'I'* in a follows from the differentiability of a solution
with respect to the initial condition (Pontryagin (1962)) and from the differentiability of the solution
in0. 
From ( 4.2) ( 4.3), 
b = 'l's*(0) = 'lfa*('lfa*(a)) 
The maximization problem can now be rewritten: 
max{ r u (x*(0),0)/ (0)d0 + f°u (z ('l'a*(0)),0)/ (0)d0a ,z ( ·) min a 
+ f a a U (z (0),0)/ (0)d 0 + mu U (X *(0),0)/ (0)d 0 .
'V*<w*<a» 
i
a 
} 
� a*('Va*(a )) 
Let us now change variables in the second integral of ( 4.5): l1 = 'l'a*(0). This integral
becomes: 
Substituting the running variable 0to11 and using ( 4.3) ( 4.4), ( 4.6) becomes 
f bu (z (0),'lfa*-1(0))/ ('l'a*-1(0)) , 
d 0 
1 ij 'Va* ('Va*- (0)) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
B 
f ('1'a*-l(9)) v +f (0) f ( 4  2) M . . . "th ( ) d ut , 1 = -- rom . . ax1m1zat1on w1 respect to z · re uces to 'Va* ('Va*- (0)) v _ 
fb V+ max� [u(z (0),0)- - u(z(0),'lfa*-1(0))]f (0)d0 v_ (4.7) 
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For any a, there exists a solution to ( 4. 7) because u ( · ,0) has by assumption a solution for 
any 0 e 8 (we are maximizing a weighted average of two such functions for every 0). 
Moreover, since u is strictly concave in z this solution is defined by:
au V+ au -1 -(z ,0) - - -(z •°IV* (0)) = 0 az v_ az a 
The solution is increasing since Ux 9 > 0 and 'Vi > 0 and differentiable from the inverse function
theorem. 
There exists a solution in a as we are maximizing a continuous function in a compact set. 
However, as ( 4.5) is not concave in a there may be multiple solutions.
Q.E.D. 
FIGURE 4.1 HERE 
Some simple results are seen directly in Figure 4.1. The set of fronts that are attacked are
those with the upper extreme values of 0. These are the values that are hardest to protect in the sense 
that pooling them with 0 's below 0 would require larger deviations from x *(0) than for the lower 
values, in T ,  which are pooled and protected from attack. It is natural that the protection is afforded 
to the fronts that are less costly to protect. 
The protection from attack in T requires an increase in x , above x *(0) for the fronts that 
cause the protection, and a decrease in x for those that are protected. Moreover, the two fronts that 
are pooled together choose an x that is between their respective values of x*(0). Again, this seems 
quite natural. 
It is interesting to compare the solution above to the Bayesian Perfect equilibria of the same 
game. The Bayesian Perfect equilibrium concept would correspond to applications where each front 
is controlled by a separate agent who optimizes given his own 0, taking the pattern of inference used 
by potential attackers as given. 
A Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium3 is a pair of functions x(0): e � IR.  and B(x): IR. � {0, l}, 
such that 
i) 0e e,x(0)e argmax[u(x,0)-8{x)w(0)]
x 
ii) F (0 Ix) is the revision of F (0) using Bayes' rule whenever possible given x and x( · )
iii) B(x)=l(O)¢::>v_ f dF(01x) + v+ f dF(01x)>(:s;)O9>9 
We limit the number of equilibria by restricting out of equilibrium beliefs. We say that 
beliefs F out of equilibrium are plausible4 if f dF (0 Ix) < f dF (0 Ix') for any x < x' where the9>9 0>9 
value x is not taken at the equilibrium while x' is taken. This plausibility requirement expresses the 
3. We give the definition only in the case of pure strategies. It can be shown that equilibria always involve pure strategies.
4. This monotonicity restriction is similar to the one found in Kreps and Wilson (1982).
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idea that the attacker knows that x*(0) is strictly monotonic and therefore believes that an unused 
value of x would be associated with a lower value of 0 than that known to be associated with higher 
x , in equilibrium. 
Theorem 3: If 0 > 0 and (S ,;£) satisfy
a) u(x*(S),S) -w+ = u (i ,0) 
b) !�-•(x)v _dF (0) + !9 v +dF (0) s; 0
Then x(0) =x*(0) 
x(e) =i 
.X(0) =x*(0) 
fore <x*-1(.£) 
fore E [x*-1(i),S]
fore> 0 
is a ( plausible) Bayesian Perfect equilibrium, and conversely. 
Proof Available from the authors. 
In any plausible Bayesian Perfect equilibrium, the conjectures about values of x that will be 
attacked are as follows. For x > .£ the incumbent agent believes that an attack will take place. 
Because ofthis, the values in the interval (i ,x*(0)) are not chosen by any 0. Instead, all 0 in 
(x *-1(.£),S) pool at i' the highest value of x, which escapes attack. Fore > e the corresponding x is
set atx*(0) where attacks actually do occur. 
In the Bayesian Perfect equilibrium which maximizes the expected payoff over all 0, b) in 
Theorem 3 holds with equality. 
FIGURE 4.2 HERE 
Proposition 1: In the Stackelberg signalling equilibrium, there are some 0 for which the payoff is 
lower than what they would receive in the Bayesian Perfect equilibrium that maximizes the expected 
payoff over all e. 
Proof: There are two cases. Either the SE pooling set, T, is included in the best BPE pooling set or 
T contains the best BPE pooling set. This is because there must be equal weighted mass on each 
side of a for both pooling sets, as f vdH = 0.
In the first case ( Figure 4.3 ), agents e, e E (0i.02) prefer the best BPE allocation because
they get their first best. 
FIGURE 4.3 HERE 
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In the second case (Figure 4.4), agents 0, 0 e (0i.0:V prefer the best BPE allocation. The
reason is as follows. In the BPE, agent 02 is indifferent between A and B . At B he is attacked; at A
he is not. Take 0 e (0i.02). In the SE he is attacked. The action� is now closer to his first best than
it was at 02 for agent 02. Therefore he strictly prefers the action�. II 
FIGURE4.4 
We have argued above that in the SE the incumbent was able to commit himself to a given 
strategy because he was moving first It is nevertheless interesting to know where the incentive 
constraints would be violated in a SE. We must choose plausible expectations about attack for the 
values of x which are not chosen. Suppose ( Figure 4.5) that for x e (x1,x2) no attack is expected
and for x e (.X ,x 3) attack is expected. 
FIGURE4.5 
All those in [0rnin•0i] are satisfying incentive constraints since they obtain their first best and 
are not attacked. All those in (01,02) do not satisfy incentive constraints, because they could choose
their first best and not be attacked ( since for x s; x, there is no attack). 
All those in [02,03] do not satisfy incentive constraints; they can move closer to their first
best, for example to x, and not be attacked. 
If 0 = 03 the incentive constraint is satisfied in general strictly ( if not one could improve the 
SE). For 0 in (03,04), in general a non-degenerate interval, therefore the incentive constraint is
violated; these values of 0 would prefer to choose x and avoid attack rather than x *(0) where they 
are attacked. For 0 > 04 the incentive constraints are satisfied at x*(0).
5. An Example
- 1 - -Let E> = [0,1], 0 = 2'T =[a ,b] and let us denote the optimal x as y( ·) if a s; 0 < 0 and as
z ( · ) for 0 < 0 < b . 
Consider now the following example: 
u (x ,0) = -(x - 0)2;
V+=-V-,W+=W,W_=O, 
F uniform 
The condition implied by the theorem for pooled values is 
f (0)y (0) = f (0)i(0) fory (0) = Z (0) for a.e. 0 E T (5.1) 
y(a) = z(l/2) y(l/2) = z(b) 
From the proof of Theorem 2 we have: 
f ('!'(0))'!'(0) = f (0). 
For the uniform distribution 
IO 
f (0) = f ('!'(0)) = 1 ;x *(0) = 0 and '!'(0) = 0 + k. 
1 From y(a) = z(l/2) we get k = i -a; from y(l/2) = z (b)  we get b = 1 -a. The
optimization problem of the principal can then be reduced to: 
subject to y (0) = z (0 + � -a) and (5.2)
Changing variables in the second integral (0 = 0 - � +a) and using (5.2) we get:
max {J [ (y (0) - 0)2 + (y (0) - 0 + _!_ -a )2] d 0 -aw} 
(a .y ( ' )) a 2 
The first order conditions are: 
yielding 
1 (y (0) - 0) + (y (0) - 0 + - -a) = o 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 (y (a) -a )2 + (y (a) --)2 -2 f (y (0) - 0 + - -a )d 0 = w 2 a 2 
a = � - '12; 
y(0) = 0  + '1; 
(5.2) 
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For any w > 0, some area is protected. As w reaches � everything is protected.
FIGURE 5.1 HERE 
It is intuitively clear that as soon as w > 0, the gain of some little pooling is of the first order
and the loss is only of the second order. As w becomes very large everything is protected since the 
loss from full protection is finite. Figure 5 .2 gives the comparison of the incumbent's levels of 
utility in the BPE and in the Stackelberg signalling equilibrium, for w = 3/32. The BPE is calculated 
by using the uniformity of F , so that e is the midpoint of the pooled set, and determining the length 
of the pooled set from (a) of Theorem 3.  
FIGURE 5.2 HERE 
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APPENDIX 
Characterization of the Stackelberg Signalling Equilibrium: Proof of Theorem 
Some further terminology will be useful in the arguments below. 
Given a strategy s let M be the induced marginal distribution of x. 
A subset S k; IR will be said to be identified if for M -almost every x e S , H (0 I x) is a 
measure degenerate at a single point. A subset S will be said to be pooled if for M -almost every 
x e S, H (0 I x) is not such a degenerate measure. The maximal subsets of identified and pooled 
values are denoted I and P respectively. 
All of the distributions and sets of observed values of x described above are determined by 
the strategy s . Where it is desirable to make this dependence explicit, we will subscript the 
corresponding value by s, for example Hs, As, etc. The first step is to show that no pooled value is 
attacked, i.e., M (P n A) = 0. 
Lemma 1: There can be no atoms of M in P n A . 
Proof· Let x be such an atom. Then for a non-null subset T k; 0, x is an atom of s ( · I 0) for 
0 e T. Define: 
T! ={0e Tl0>0andx<x*(0)-e} 
T!!:. ={0e Tl0>0andx>x*(0) +e} 
For e suffi small, at least one of T ! and T !!:. must be non-null. Without loss of generality, 
assume it is T ! . Take x > x such that x -x < e and that x is not an atom of M. (This is possible 
because there are at most a countable number of atoms.) Then modify s to s' by replacing the atom 
at x, with an atom of equal mass at x, for all e e T ! . Under the strategy s ' the increased valutl of x 
with positive probability, in the direction of the optimum will cause fudGs' > J udGs . The value of
f f w (0)ds (x I 0)dF (0) will not increase because M (As 1) ::;; M (As). Thus s ' is a superior strategy to
0 A, 
s . The case in which T !!:. is non-null is symmetrically treated. II
FIG URE A.1 HERE 
Lemma2: M(P nA)=O 
Proof· By the above, we know that M is non-atomic on P n A. Assume that M (P n A) is 
positive. Consider the joint distribution G (0,x) restricted to x E P n A, denoted by G 1(0,x ). Let
H 1(0 I x) be the conditional distribution of e, defined from G 1, on P n A. Let 
Ce={(0,x)e 0x(P nA) I I x- x*(0)1 <E}. If,for alle>O,G1(Ce)=M(P nA),then 
H1(0 Ix) would be degenerate ate =x*-1(x) for each x e P nA. This would contradict the fact 
that they are pooled values. II 
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FIGURE A.2 HERE 
Thus there exists e > 0 and 11 > 0 such that M (P fl A ) -G 1 (CE) > 11. It follows that either
there exist subsets T + � E> and V + � P fl A such that for each 0 e T +• v e V +• v > x *(0) + e and 
G 1(T + x V +) > 0, or else there are T _ and V _ with v < x*(0) - e and G 1(T_ x V _) > 0. Without loss 
of generality we can consider the former case. Following a method similar to that used in the 
preliminary lemma above, replace s by the strategy s' that assigns a point mass of s (V + I 0) at a 
given x e V + arbitrarily close to inf x e V + for every 0 e T +• and such that 
x 
s '(V + fl {x Ix > x} I 0) = 0. As above, this improves the efficiency of the strategy s with respect to
f u dG while not increasing As because x is already an attacked value and therefore not increasing
J f wdG. II
E>A, 
We then show that for identified values, the incumbent is choosing the action that maximizes 
u (x, 0). 
Lemma 3: For M -almost every x e I , H (0 I x) is a point mass concentrated at 0 = x * -• (x ). 
Proof· Let Q>(x) be the value of 0 E 8 corresponding to the observation of x e I. Let <I> � 8 X I be
its graph, that is, 
<I>= {(0,x) I 0=Q>(x),x e /} 
Let X*={(0,x) I x  =x*(0),0e E>}. We want to show thatG(<I>\X*)=O. 
We follow the same procedure as in Lemma 2 above. If G (<I> \X *) > 0, then there must be 
an e > 0 such that G (<I> \N E(X *)) > 0. We then can find T contained in either e_ or E>+ and V � I 
such that G ((T x V) fl (<I> \N E(X*)) > 0 and either (0, x) e (T x V) implies x > x*(0) + e or 
(0, x) e T x V implies x < x *(0) - e. Thus there are four possible cases, as T x V is above or below
X * and to the right or left of 0. In any case, a superior strategy, s ', can be found by assigning all the
mass in T x V to a single point x e I which is selected arbitrarily close to the extreme of V closer to 
X *. (For example, see Figure A. 3) 
FIGURE A.3 HERE 
This change creates a pooled value, x , such that Hs 1(T I x) = 1 and Ms 1( {x}) > 0.
If T � e_, x e: As, and if T � 0+, x e As'· In either case, however, As =As 1 and
J J wdGs = J J w dGs'· Thus the change is beneficial because J J u dG is increased. II
9A,. 9A,. 
We next show that in the optimal strategy all unattacked pooled values are on the margin of 
being attacked. 
Lemma 4: For M -almost every x e P ,  f vdH = 0.
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Proof: 
1)  Assume that there is a non-null subset V !;;;; P with x > x*(0) for all x e V and such that
J vdH (0 I x )  < 0 for almost every x e V. We can find a further non-null subset V' !;;;; V such that
fvdH (0 I x)<O<Ofor almost every x e V'. Rewrite the last expression as
v_H (E>_ I x )+v+ H(E>+ I x)<O<O 
Since x > x *(0) we know that x > x *(0) for all 0 E e_. We will improve the strategy s by
introducing a small randomization which assigns a point mass at x *(0) to 0 e e_, decreases 
H (E>_ I x) slightly for x e V', and otherwise does not changes . This change improves the 
efficiency of the choice of x with respect to f udG and, as it does not cause J vdH � 0 to be violated
for any x where it was satisfied under s , it does not increase A or J J wdG . Hence s was not
0A 
optimal. 
2) Now consider the complementary case where J vdH < 0 for x e V, and x < x *( S) for all 
x e V.  As above, let V' be a non-null subset of V with f vdH < o < 0 for all x e V' and let T !;;;; E>+
be such that G ( T x V') > 0. 
For arbitrary e > 0, partition V' into V; and V �, such that X+ > x_ for X+ e V $, x_ e V �
and such that M (V �) < e. Then modify the strategy s by setting, for 0 e T: 
s'(V� I 0) = 0 
s (V� I 0) 
s'(x I 0) =s (x I 0)X( l + ) for x E v; 
s (V$ I 0) 
This improves J udG because x*(0) > x for (0, x) e T x V'. For E sufficiently small and 
x e V $ , J vdH8 , is still non-positive, and thus still avoids attack. For v e V � , J vdH81, < J vdHs .
Thus s '  improves J udG and does not increase the probability of attack for any 0. II
Let T1- = {0 e EL Is ( /  I 0) >0} 
Let Tp- = {0 E e_ r s ( P  I 0) > 0}. 
Lemma 5: There exists 0_ E e_ such that if Tr and T p are non-null, then 0 E T1- implies 0 � 0_ and
0 E Tp- implies 0 � 0_.
Proof· If the lemma were false, there would exist non-null sets Tp !;;;; Tp- and T1!;; T1-. and a >  0 
such that 0 e Tp and 0' e T1 implies 0 < 0' - a. 
From the previous lemmas we know that, almost-everywhere, for 0 e T1, s ( · I 0) has an
atom at x*(0). Moreover, there is no other 0 e e that has an atom at this value. 
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Consider the distribution of x given 0 E Tp ' 
J s(x I 0)dF (0)
Tp 
µ(x I Tp)=--
F
-
(
-
Tp
_
) 
__ 
As 0 e Tp is pooled with positive probability, there is aµ non-null set, P ', of pooled values.
By Lemma 4 all pooled values have f vdH = 0, hence, for all x e P ', H (8+ I x) > 0.
There are now two cases according to whether or not µ(P +) > 0, where 
P+=P'n{x lx�x*(0),forall0e TI} 
FIGURE A.4 HERE 
Let us consider first the case where µ(P +) > 0. In this instance, G will assign positive mass
to the rectangle R+ = Tp x P + .  
An improvement in s can be made by assigning some of the mass in R + to X *, removing the 
same amount of mass from X * n { (0, x) I 0 e Tr}, and distributing it over R '+ = T1 x P + in such a 
way that M is unchanged. Because u is concave in x and Uxa> 0 we know that Jf udG is improved,
and at the same time A and J f wdG are invariant.
0A 
In the case µ(P +) = 0, G will assign zero mass to R +· There will exist 0 e T1 such that G
will assign positive mass to R _ = Tp x (P' n {x I x < x *(S)} ). 
FIGURE A.S HERE 
As R_ consists almost surely of pooled values, and f vdH = 0 for all pooled values, G must
assign positive mass to the rectangle K = {(0,x) I 0 e 8+,x < x*(0)}. An improvement can be 
made, by virtue of convexity, by pooling some of the mass in K with values of 0 in T1 such that 
0 > e. This would allow an increase in x towards X* with positive probability. II
On the right of 0 the situation is much the same, and we will omit the proof. 
Define 
T/ = {0 e 8+ I s (I I 0) > 0}
T/={0e 8+ I s(P I 0)>0} 
Lemma 6: There exists S+ such that if T/ and T/ are non-null, then 0 e T /implies 0 � S+, and 
0 E T/ implies 0 � 0+. 
Thus we have the following diagram: 
FIGURE A.6 HERE 
Let 
f = [0_, 0+] 
Ji= [x*(0_),x*(0+)l 
- - -
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Lemma7: G(T xP)=F (T). 
If G(f x P) < F (T), then either G(f x (x*(0+), oo)) > 0 or G (f x (-oo,x*(0_))) > 0. In 
either case, the strategy can be improved by moving the corresponding mass towards f x {x*(0+)} 
or f x {x*(0_)}. 
We now show that on f, s is non-stochastic and monotonic increasing over fp and T /.
Lemma8: 
Proof. 
- - -
LetA = {(0,x) e T XP I 0 > 0,x >x*(0)} 
- - -
andB ={(0,x)e T xP I 0<0,x <x*(0)}. 
Then G (A) = G (B ) = 0
We will show G (A)= 0, as the proof for B is completely analogous. If G (A) > 0, then 
G (A')> 0 where A I= {(0,x) E f x p I 0 «e.x > x*(S)}. This is because f vdH = 0 for all x E P.
But then the strategy could be improved by moving a positive mass in A' and A downward towards
X*, in such a way as to maintain fvdH = 0. II
FIGURE A.7 HERE 
Lemma 9: On f, s is almost surely non-stochastic and monotonic non-decreasing over Tp- and T/. 
Proof: Let us consider Tj. Ifs is stochastic or ifs is non-stochastic but decreasing over a non­
degenerate part of the domain, then there exist e E T p- and x E p and rectangles c 1 and c 2 such
that 
(0, X) E C 1 implies 0 < S and X > X
(0,x) e C 2 implies 0 > Sand x < .X
and with G ( C 1) and G ( C 2) > 0. For any e > 0, we can find subrectangles of C 1 and C 2, denoted D 1 
and D 2, with positive mass and such that e exceeds their diameters. 
FIGURE A.8 HERE 
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Let these rectanges be given by the products 
X12 +X11 X22 +X21 Let a = 
2 - 2 be the distance between the centers of D 1 and D 2 in their x -
coordinate, denoted respectively x 1 and x2• 
Consider a pair of distributions on D 1 and D 2  with equal mass and dominated by G. Denote 
them by 'Vt and 'ljf2. Let G = G - ('ljf 1 + '1'2). 
We will consider a modification of the strategy that will be shown to be beneficial. It 
involves moving the distribution 'Vl downward and 'Vz upward, and leaving the residual G 
unchanged. This modification will now be described in three steps. 
Step 1 
Concentrate the distributions 'ljf 1 and 'ljf2 on the segments { (0, x) e D 1 I x = x 1} and
{ (0, x) e D 2 I x = x 2} respectively. This will result in a loss of at most 2'1jf 1(D1) · � · iix, where
'iix = sup I Ux I . Let the resulting distributions be denoted 'Vla and 'ljf29, they are just the(9,x)e D1 
marginal distributions of 'ljf 1 and 'Vz over E>. 
Step2 
Translate the resulting distributions downward and upward, respectively, by the distance a. 
This changes the utility by 
Note, however, that x 1 - x2 = a, so that for each�. x 1 -� = x2 +a -�. Therefore the change in
utility can be written 
For each x e [x 2, x 1] the bracketed expression can be bounded above by 
Thus the change in utility from the translations defined in this step is bounded below by 
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Step3 
Redistribute the mass which has now been shifted to the interval [(011, x2), (012, x2)] in such 
a way that its marginal distribution over x duplicates the marginal distribution of the original D 2• 
Likewise for the other segment and D 1• As in Step 1, since these involve movements of at most � , 
the loss is bounded by '1'1(D 1) · � · iix . 
Clearly, as e can be taken arbitrarily small, the gain obtained in Step 2 can be made to 
outweigh the potential losses in Steps 1 and 3. II 
Lemma JO 
On Ti and T/ s is strictly increasing. 
Proof· 
Suppose, to the contrary, thats is constant, x, over a nondegenerate subinterval Tx- � T j. 
Then s must also be concentrated at x over a subinterval T/ � T /. This strategy can be improved 
upon following a method analagous to that used in the last lemma, in steps 1 and 2 :
First observe that ifs is optimal then the level of x cannot be advantageously varied. 
Thus 
J Ux(X, 0)dF (0) = 0.
T{uTp 
Because Uxa> 0, we can find a pair of subintervals of equal mass, fx- � Tx- and f/ � T/ such that
Then, by changing s to have a slightly lower common value on fx- u f/ the payoff can be
improved. II 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
1) follows from Lemmas 3, 5, 6.
2), 3) follows from Lemma 10. 
To prove 4), we use lemma 4 to write 
v_f dF(0 Ix)+ v+f dF(0 Ix)= 0, for x e P
9_ 9+ 
From lemma 9 we know thats is almost surely non-stochastic, and that F (0 Ix) is concentrated on
two values, 0 = y-1( x) and 0 = z-1( x  ). From lemma 10, y and z are increasing. Therefore the two
integrals in the last equation are almost everywhere the densities f (9) and f �) . 
y(0) i(0) 
This completes the proof of 4). 
19 
Part 5) follows from the monotonicity guaranteed in lemma 9 and the domains of definition
of y and z proven in parts 2) and 3). II 
20 
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